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Abstract  
 
To what extent does the institution of insurance influence a system of 
compensation for personal injury? On the one hand some academics have 
suggested that insurance has been no more than a „makeweight‟ 
argument in the development of tort liability. On the other hand, others 
have claimed that insurance has had a substantial effect, even if this is 
often hidden or not discussed openly. This article lends support to one 
side of the debate by describing the enormous importance of insurers to 
personal injury litigation in the United Kingdom. It argues that all cases, 
in their wider context, have been affected by the practices of insurance 
companies. This is the case even though insurance is rarely mentioned by 
judges and largely ignored by textbooks on tort law. Insurers provide the 
lifeblood of the system. 
 
The article examines statistics relating to the number of tort claims 
brought each year and it notes the extent of insurer involvement. As the 
paymasters of the system, insurers not only compensate claimants but 
also fund the cost of legal representation, often for both sides. Insurers 
have reduced their use of defence lawyers and the extent that they 
institute formal legal proceedings. However, it is their bureaucracy which 
determines whether, when and for how much claims are settled, and it is 
their offices, rather than courts of law, that are the key places for tort in 
practice. The scope for compensating those injured very much depends 
upon the incidence of insurance protection, and the amount of damages 
paid can only be understood against the insurance background. Finally, 
the article considers the influence of insurers upon potential changes in 
the law. The importance of insurers ought not to be underestimated: 
without insurance, the system of compensation for personal injury would 
have collapsed long ago. 
 
 2 
Introduction 
This article summarises the structural importance of insurers to the system of 
compensation for personal injury in the U.K. It is part of a much wider study of the 
relationship between the rules of tort law, on the one hand, and the availability of 
insurance, on the other.
1
 It has been argued that judges appear more ready to impose 
liability when insurance enables the cost of compensation to be more widely 
distributed.
2
 Tort rules have been said to have been developed in favour of claimants, 
at least in situations where they have been less able to protect themselves by taking 
out their own first party insurance. Others have denied that there is any consistent 
pattern in the law which reflects such a close relationship with insurance.
3
 However, 
here it is argued that the overall influence of insurers upon the system makes it 
difficult to view any tort case in isolation: each and every case is affected, no matter 
whether determined in court or out of it. The detailed rules of tort are not examined 
here.
4
 Instead we concentrate upon the institutional context within which tort law is 
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practised and insurance functions in the U.K. How important are insurers to the 
litigation system and in what ways do they influence it? 
The structure of this article falls into four broad and inter-related parts:- 
(1) We first set out the number of claims made each year for personal injury in the 
U.K. and argue that the real defendants in the great majority of these cases are not 
individuals but insurance companies. Insurers are the paymasters of the tort system, 
being responsible not only for the damages received by claimants but also the costs 
obtained by the lawyers on either side. Those who pay the piper also call the tune, and 
the influence insurers are able to bear as a result is considerable. 
(2) The article next examines how the bureaucratic organisation of insurance, 
rather than the payment of the parties, affects the course and the outcome of litigation. 
The structure of the insurance industry is such that the defence of claims is 
concentrated in the hands of only a few companies and law firms, and economic 
pressures mean that the vast majority of cases are settled out of court, many without 
the involvement of defence lawyers at all. Judges also have a very limited role to play, 
being involved in only one per cent of cases. The realities of the settlement system are 
such that, in practice, the strict rules of tort law are simplified and result in many more 
claimants obtaining compensation than the rules actually support. At the same time 
this liberal system can be seen as inequitable because success is dependent not upon 
theoretical liability rules but upon suffering the type of injury for which liability 
insurance has been made compulsory. Small claims are over-compensated whereas 
victims of serious injury are under-compensated. This “lottery of litigation” is 
compounded by the pressures which the system places upon individual claimants with 
the result that those from a particular class or background will do better than others, 
but only rarely will they obtain the sums which would be awarded by a judge at trial. 
(3) Consideration of the sums obtained by claimants leads us into the third part of 
the article which stresses the importance of insurers to the award of damages. Without 
a mechanism for distributing the resulting costs it would rarely be worth the time and 
effort we presently expend to establish the liability to pay. Insurers provide the 
lifeblood of the system. 
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(4) The final section examines the influence of insurers upon government and the 
creation of legislation. The lobbying of insurers, especially in private, has been 
extremely effective in conserving the older and perhaps outdated values enshrined in 
the tort system. This leads to the final conclusion that without insurance the tort 
system could not have survived. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider what 
might have taken its place as a fairer and more efficient system of accident 
compensation. However, we are left with an appreciation of the importance of insurers 
to present tort law, and a denial of the claim that insurance has had only a limited 
effect upon the legal system. 
 The Number of Claims 
Last year in the U.K. there were 755,000 claims brought for personal injury – one 
for every 77 people.
5
 Although the previous year was responsible for a record number 
of claims, the overall trend shows that the underlying rate of claim has remained 
relatively constant since 1997 when new methods of recording claims were 
introduced. It is true that the overall number of claims had previously increased to 
reach a peak of 770,000, but this increase was wholly attributable to the special 
circumstances which had caused an exceptional rise in disease claims as opposed to 
accidents. 
What were these special circumstances?  Disease claims rose almost threefold over 
the two years to 2004, from 74,000 to 213,000 a year. This was the result of the 
impetus created by the imposition of a cut off date for claims under the special 
compensation rules devised for particular diseases suffered by coalminers. Law firms 
intensively solicited these claims, and since 1999 they have registered over 740,000 of 
them. These coalmining claims supposedly constitute “the biggest personal injury 
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schemes in British legal history and possibly the world.”6 However, fewer claims are 
now being brought for other types of disease, and the extra difficulties of bringing 
such claims are well known.
7
 
By contrast with the disease claims the numbers for those involving accidents has 
actually reduced. As shown in the below table, in the past five years there has been a 
five per cent fall in the overall number of accident claims. Whereas the number of 
motor claims has remained remarkably stable, medical negligence claims have fallen 
by 34 per cent, employers‟ liability by 21 per cent, and public liability by seven per 
cent. It can be seen that motor claims constitute almost 70 per cent of all accident 
claims in the tort system. 
The Numbers and Types of Accident Claims Notified Since 2000 
 (Source: U.K. Compensation Recovery Unit) 
 Medical Employer Public Motor Other Total 
00/01 10,980 97,675 94,000 401,740 7,815 612,120 
01/02 9,773 97,004 100,663 400,434 6,252 614,126 
02/03 7,973 92,915 109,441 398,870 6,347 615,546 
03/04 7,109 79,286 91,177 374,740 4,874 557,186 
04/05 7,196 77,765 86,966 402,892 4,463 579,282 
 
The Real Defendants 
Although the majority of these claims for injury are brought against defendants 
who are individual people, almost all of them are insured against their liability. 
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Employers, most organisations and companies, and many public bodies who are sued 
are similarly insured. The result is that in nine out of ten cases the real defendants are 
insurance companies, with the remainder comprising large self-insured organisations 
or public bodies, such as government departments and health authorities. 
It is extremely rare indeed for an uninsured individual to be the real defendant. 
Instead tort defendants are policyholders who cede control over their case to their 
insurer and thereafter usually play little or no part in the litigation process. For 
example, Harry Street, former Professor of Law at Manchester University and author 
of Street on Torts, admitted that he was once a defendant in a case but only discovered 
that it had been determined on appeal when he read about it in a newspaper.
8
 Insurers 
in practice determine how the defence is to be conducted. This means, for example, 
that they commonly make admissions without the consent of the insured,
9
 and they 
can settle cases in spite of objection from the policyholder.
10
 
The Paymasters 
Insurers are the paymasters of the tort system, being responsible for 94 per cent of 
tort compensation for personal injury.
 11
 They process the routine payments and they 
decide which elements of damage they will accept or contest. It is unusual for them to 
contest liability, one recent study revealing that insurers‟ files “contained remarkably 
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little discussion of liability,” finding it initially denied in only 20 per cent of cases. 12 
As a result, eventually insurers make at least some payment in the great majority of 
personal injury claims, often because most of them are of very low value. Overall 
about 89 per cent of motor claims and 77 per cent of employers liability claims are 
successful,
 13
 although it has been suggested that of 150,000 cases supported by trade 
unions, about 95 per cent result in some payment to the claimant.
14
 Tort thus provides 
a structure for processing mass payments of small amounts of compensation; only 
very rarely does it stage a gladiatorial contest to determine whether a particular 
defendant was in the wrong. Contrary to the impression gained from tort textbooks, 
duty of care, causation of damage, and even breach of duty are generally not in dispute 
in cases processed by the system. 
In the great majority of cases insurers pay not only compensation to claimants, but 
also the litigation costs of both sides. However, if an action fails the claimant may 
become liable for costs. To avoid this, after their injury, claimants may be offered by 
loss insurers a policy which promises to pay their costs in the event of an unsuccessful 
claim. If the claim proves successful, the premium can be added to the damages 
awarded in tort. Insurers may also offer such legal expenses insurance in other 
contexts. For example, it is estimated that around 17 million motor policies and 15 
million household policies offer „before the event‟ legal expenses insurance. The 
result is that legal expenses insurers now control litigation in 80 per cent of motor 
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accident claims, and their market penetration is expected to continue to increase.
15
 
Legal expenses insurance can affect key aspects of the litigation.
16
 In particular, 
claimants cannot easily choose their own lawyer and may be required to use one from 
a panel approved by the insurer.
17
 As a result it is estimated that soon almost all road 
accident cases will be dealt with by no more than a hundred of the 9,000 solicitors‟ 
firms nationwide.
18
 The clients of these solicitors may receive a different service 
compared to those claimants free to choose their own lawyer: conflicts of interest are 
more likely to arise.
19
 Insurers thus fund the tort system, control much of the 
representation, and can have an interest in whatever the outcome of a claim. 
Insurers’ Bureaucratic Organisation 
Classic empirical studies reveal that, in practice, the rules of tort law are much less 
important than the textbooks might lead one to suppose: it is insurance bureaucracy 
that dictates the course of litigation procedure, and determines whether, when, and for 
how much, claims are settled.
20
 The important centres of personal injury practice are 
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insurers‟ buildings, rather than courts of law, or even solicitors' offices. A senior judge 
has even suggested that solicitors might no longer be involved with small claims 
where defendants are insured, and that insurers could be left to administer these 
claims alone.
21
 In effect this is what may happen if a particular reform is brought to 
fruition: prompted by the Better Regulation Task Force,
22
 the Government is 
considering whether to raise from £1,000 to £5,000 the limit for personal injury claims 
which may be taken through the small claims procedure without costs being awarded 
for legal representation. Claimant lawyers are alarmed at the prospect and have 
campaigned to resist the change. Whether or not this campaign succeeds, it is already 
the case that insurers‟ offices are the key places for determining most tort claims. 
They could be even more important in the future. 
The number of such insurance centres has declined recently because of company 
mergers and greater specialisation. The work has been concentrated in particular 
localities. Consolidation in the general liability market has resulted in it being 
dominated by only eight major companies, although there are more than fifty other 
smaller firms issuing policies.
23
 For motor insurance there were over 350 companies 
authorised to transact motor insurance in 2002, but only 65 companies and 11 Lloyds 
syndicates actively did so. The ten largest motor insurers controlled two thirds of the 
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market.
24
 The three quarters of a million claimants suffering personal injury last year 
therefore came up against only a few handfuls of real defendants. 
In dealing with claims, insurers have developed highly systematised approaches 
which make extensive use of information technology. Their standard procedures have 
been refined further for the “fast track” cases involving smaller amounts of money. 
They closely monitor the performance of not only their in-house claims handlers but 
also the lawyers they choose to instruct. Striving for efficiency, they have reduced the 
number of solicitors‟ firms acting for them. Economic pressures mean that 
communication between the parties takes place on the telephone rather than via letters 
or face to face meetings, and the outcome of a claim is likely to be influenced as much 
by an impersonal computerised assessment as by the discretion of the claims handler 
involved.
25
 Although these generalisations about how litigation is conducted do not 
apply to all insurers for every type of case,
26
 they have a great effect upon the way in 
which tort rules are viewed and used in practice. 
The Use of Lawyers and Courts 
Insurers determine the extent that lawyers become involved in disputes, and the 
tactics that are used in the proceedings. Increasingly cases are being settled at an early 
stage, and without resort to the issue of court documents. One survey found all parties 
in agreement that, after recent reforms of civil procedure, cases were now more likely 
to be resolved without court involvement.
27
 Major insurers estimated that, because of 
earlier settlement, the number of cases disposed of only after the issue of formal 
proceedings had declined by a third. According to the Court Service the number of 
new claims issued in the county court has fallen by 32 per cent in the past five years. 
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Of course, it has always been the case that the great majority of claims settle 
informally: thirty years ago 86 per cent of cases were being settled without formal 
proceedings in the form of a writ being issued.
28
 Now even more cases are being 
settled at an early stage. 
Insurers are avoiding not only courts, but also lawyers. Defence lawyers are being 
bypassed. In 2004 AXA insurance company announced that it had reduced by half the 
number of law firms defending its cases. Similarly over a period of four years the 
Zurich insurance company decimated the number of firms representing its 
policyholders in catastrophic cases: only four firms now defend such cases for this 
insurer. More generally, the Law Society noted that the number of firms carrying out 
personal injury work fell from 28 per cent in 1999 to 21 per cent in 2002.  
Insurers decide, in particular, whether a case merits the very exceptional treatment 
of being taken to a court hearing. Before being set down for trial 98 per cent of cases 
are settled, and many of those that remain in the system are concluded before any 
hearing takes place.
29
  In one survey only 5 out of the 762 “ordinary” cases with costs 
of less than £5,000 went to trial.
30
 In effect, insurers allow trial judges to determine 
only one per cent of all the claims made. Only a few of these are appealed with the 
result that the senior judiciary are left to adjudicate upon a small fraction of what are, 
by then, very untypical cases. Whether an appeal court is to be given an opportunity to 
examine a point of tort law may depend upon the insurer for, if it serves the insurer's 
purpose for doubt to remain, the claimant can be paid in full and threatened with a 
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costs award if the action is continued.
31
 In this sense tort principles have been shaped 
by and for insurers, even though there has been a significant growth in the power and 
expertise of claimant lawyers in the last twenty years.
32
 
The Realities of the Settlement System 
Insurers‟ influence upon settlements is even more pronounced than it is upon 
decided cases. The lawyer asked by his client to advise on the merits of a claim is 
concerned with the realities of the litigation system rather than the formal rules of law. 
Practitioners would agree with the key analysis of Ross
33
 that the textbook rules of 
tort are often transformed when they come to be used in the system in three ways: 
firstly, they are simplified; secondly, they are made more liberal; and thirdly, they are 
made more inequitable. 
Simplification occurs because the rules are too uncertain when applied to the 
individual facts of particular accidents. For reasons of cost and administrative 
efficiency, insurers have been forced to substitute other criteria for the strict tort rules. 
Mechanical rules of thumb - such as the car running into the back of another always 
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being found the one at fault - replace any detailed investigation into blame. There is 
neither the time nor resources to instruct experts to analyse the scene of each road 
accident and precisely measure its effect upon the individual claimant. Cases are 
disposed of on the basis of paperwork alone, and this may bear only a limited 
relationship to what actually occurred. 
The result of the cost pressures upon insurers is that the system is very liberal in 
that many more claims succeed than the strict rules of tort would allow. Often insurers 
pay something for claims which, on full investigation, would be without foundation. 
As a result 
“… wherever there is insurance there is … a closer approximation to 
the objectives of social insurance in fact than the doctrines of tort law 
would lead one to suppose.”34 
However, this liberality is but part of a system which overall is weighted in favour 
of insurers and results in much inequality. Indeed the case often used to illustrate the 
general inequalities in the legal system involves a “one-shotter” accident victim suing 
a “repeat player” insurer.35 Delay, uncertainty, financial need and other pressures 
cause claimants to accept sums much lower than a judge would award. The eagerness 
of claimants and their solicitors to get something from the system is reflected in the 
fact that, in the past, in two out of three cases they accepted the very first formal offer 
made to them by the “risk neutral” insurer.36 Although a more recent study discloses 
more bargaining, almost a third of cases still settled after only one offer, and two 
thirds settled after two.
37
 Those claimants who can withstand the pressures of 
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litigation do better than those who cannot, with the result that those from a particular 
class or background are more likely to succeed.
38
 Those who suffer most are the 
severely injured. Although in the greatest need, they will find their high value claim 
scrutinised in detail and processed very differently from the average case which 
typically involves but a minor upset and little, if any, financial loss. Those seriously 
injured are much less likely to receive “full” compensation than those suffering minor 
injury,
39
 although they are left in a much better position than accident victims forced 
to rely upon state benefits alone. The great majority of claimants quickly recover from 
their minor injury and, for a variety of reasons, are likely to emerge over-compensated 
for their economic loss.
40
 
The overall result of the settlement system is that rough and ready justice is 
dispensed, much influenced by the insurance company personnel and procedures, and 
driven by the needs of the insurance industry and the cost of the legal process. The 
system produces arbitrary results and bears only a limited relationship to the portrayal 
of justice contained in the traditional tort textbook. 
The Effects of Compulsory Insurance 
The importance of insurers to the tort system is reflected in the fact that the claims 
which are brought closely match the areas where liability insurance is to be found. 
Thus road and work accidents predominate partly because those are the two major 
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areas where tort insurance is compulsory.
41
 They constitute 86 per cent of all the 
claims brought for personal injury, with motor comprising 53 per cent of the total and 
employer liability 33 per cent.
42
 They dominate the practice of tort even though they 
constitute a minority of all accidents, and are an even smaller percentage of the causes 
of all forms of disablement and incapacity for work. One survey found the more 
common accidents were those in the home, or suffered in the course of leisure 
activities or in playing sport, and yet very few of these resulted in any damages 
award.
43
  Although work and transport injuries dominate the tort system, at best they 
are the cause of only about half of all accidents,
44
 and some surveys suggest that they 
are much less important than this. For example, it has been estimated that there were 
7.8 million accidents in the home in 1999 but in only 0.5 per cent of these was there 
the potential for a successful tort claim.
45
  
All this means that the place where you are injured is crucial. Accidents in areas 
not covered by liability insurance are extremely unlikely to be compensated. 
According to one study, whereas 1 in 4 road accident victims and 1 in 10 work 
accident victims get something from tort, only 1 in 67 injured elsewhere do so.
46
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44
 Pearson op cit vol 2 table 57. In Australia they are less than a fifth according to H. Luntz and D. 
Hambly, Torts: Cases and Commentary (Sydney: Butterworths, 5
th
 ed 2002) 4. 
45
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Overall, only one accident victim in 16 who is incapacitated for three days of more is 
compensated by the tort system. However, if we concern ourselves only with serious 
injuries, tort becomes much more important: where an accident causes incapacity for 
work for six months or more, almost a third of victims receive tort damages. 
However, this increased significance of tort can then be severely undermined: the 
importance of the tort system is reduced tenfold if account is taken of those suffering 
disablement not from accidents alone, but from all causes, including congenital illness 
and disease.
47
 Tort then has only a very marginal role to play, and is insignificant 
compared to the provision made by social security and the welfare state. 
The scope of the tort system is affected not only by the areas where liability 
insurance has been made compulsory, but also by the existence of alternative sources 
of compensation. What opportunities are there for resort to either welfare payments 
from public insurance, or policy monies from first party private insurance? These may 
reduce the incentive to pursue a common law claim. The interrelationship of 
compensation systems cannot be discussed in detail here,
48
 but one example will 
suffice to demonstrate the potential effects of other insurance systems upon tort.
49
 The 
example is a historical one and, in practice, resulted in the abandonment of tort law 
for the great majority of work injuries. It derives from the „election‟ rule whereby 
workers injured in the course of their employment had to choose either to sue in tort 
or to claim private insurance benefits on a no-fault basis from their employer. They 
could not do both by obtaining these insurance benefits and pursuing an action in tort. 
For a variety of reasons employees overwhelmingly opted, or were pressed into 
receiving the no-fault benefits,
50
 leaving the tort system with a very limited role to 
                                                 
47
 P. S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 100. 
48
 See Lewis, “Tort and Social Security” in U. Magnus (ed), The Impact of Social Security Law on Tort 
Law (Vienna: Springer, 2003). 
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play in the industrial field.
51
 There was judicial criticism of the “deplorable” and 
“extremely shabby” tactics used by insurers to prevent tort claims being pursued.52 
Eventually the „employer privilege‟ was abolished in 1948,53 and since that time tort 
claims for work accidents have flourished, now constituting a third of all the actions 
brought in the U.K.
54
 The privilege continues in North America, a few European 
countries, and increasingly in Australia. 
Insurers and the Award of Damages 
This influence of insurance upon the general pattern of tort liability is matched by 
its effect upon the level of compensation awarded. In the U.S.A. it is very clear that 
individual damages awards have been affected by the policy limits set by insurers. 
There is evidence that lawyers do not pursue claims beyond these limits in order to 
obtain “blood money” from defendants personally.55 However, in the U.K. the policy 
limits for a claim are almost never relevant. The unlimited basis of insurer liability is 
graphically illustrated by a case arising from the Selby rail disaster where a negligent 
motorist caused a railway accident resulting in his insurer being liable to various 
claimants for a total of £22 million.
56
 Because of the absence of policy limits in the 
U.K. it is less easy to see the precise effect of insurance cover in the individual case. 
However, here it is argued that the principles upon which damages are assessed 
implicitly recognise that it is a company with a deep pocket that will pay and not an 
                                                 
51
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chap 10. 
52
 Deane v H. F. Edwards & Co (1941) 34 BWCC 183. 
53
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individual, and this is fundamental to the continued existence of the personal injury 
system. 
Most awards in tort are for very limited sums - little more than £2,500.
57
 But in 
2002 insurers estimated that one per cent of cases resulted in a payment of £100,000 
or more, and that these were responsible for 32 per cent of the total damages paid out 
by the system.
58
 There are very few individuals who could afford to pay the amounts 
required in these serious injury cases. The justice of the case never merits an 
investigation into the limited means of the average person found liable because that 
person will not have to pay. It is clear that “the size of damages awards … is 
explicable only on the basis that judges are influenced by the widespread presence of 
insurance.”59 This is a major point. The possibility of awarding millions of pounds in 
damages all to be paid in one lump sum distinguishes tort from welfare and other 
compensation systems. Liability insurance enables tort to espouse its distinctive 
rhetoric: it purports to make an assessment of loss that is not only tailored to the 
individual claimant, but sufficient to restore the position before injury took place. 
When set against the results achieved in practice these claims are greatly overstated,
60
 
and yet they form much of the reason for tort‟s existence. Without a mechanism to 
distribute the cost of imposing liability, it would rarely be worth assessing damages in 
the way we do at present in serious injury claims. Without insurance it is doubtful 
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whether the tort system would survive at all.
61
 Insurance, in this sense, provides the 
lifeblood of tort. 
In recent years major changes have been made to the assessment of damages, and 
many of these are predicated upon payment being made either by insurers or other 
large self-insured bodies. The assessment of damages has become ever more precise. 
Actuarial and forensic accountancy evidence has become commonplace. Such matters 
as the discount rate for early receipt of damages,
62
 the interest rate on delayed 
payment,
63
 and the inflation factor enabling past awards to be compared with those of 
the present day have all been more closely linked to the wider financial world. In a 
few serious injury cases lump sum payment has been replaced in part by a structured 
settlement, a reform prompted, manufactured and, until recently, controlled by 
insurers and insurance intermediaries.
64
 It is impossible to conceive of such 
developments - involving continuing lifetime obligations to make increasing payments 
- if it were not for the fact that individuals almost never pay tort damages themselves. 
The argument here is that it is not easy to divorce these changing rules on assessment 
and payment of damages from the fact that it is insurers who run the tort system. 
Insurers, Legislation and Pressure Group Politics 
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One of the main reasons for U.K. insurers forming their own trade association in 
1917 was in order to respond to potential changes in the law.
65
 The Association of 
British Insurers (ABI) has since grown to such an extent that, with the exception of the 
National Farmers‟ Union, it is now more than twice the size of any other trade 
association.
66
 With an annual budget of over £20 million, it has been very effective in 
putting forward the industry‟s point of view. Its lobbying of government ministries is 
such that one insurance commentator has even suggested that, internationally, 
institutions such as the ABI “see themselves as governing governments.”67  
The ABI has also ensured that its case is heard in Parliament. Until 1997 one in ten 
Members of Parliament declared a financial link with the insurance industry,
68
 
although this figure has now been halved. The author's more recent examination of the 
Register of Members' Interests  revealed that only eight members of the House of 
Lords declared an insurance interest, one being membership of Lloyds. In contrast, 
fifteen Members of Parliament declared connections with insurance companies, and a 
further nineteen recorded that they were current or former members of Lloyds. 
The regulatory framework of insurance reflects the success of the ABI in arguing 
for forms of self-regulation in lieu of statutory controls, and for exemption from 
general legislation that might otherwise apply. The clearest example of this is the last 
minute exemption of insurance policies from domestic legislation dealing with control 
of unfair contract terms, a result described by the former Director General of Fair 
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Trading as “amazing.”69  Because of such influence, insurance remains the least 
regulated of contracts. 
The ABI is organised so as to respond to all government proposals to change the 
wide areas of law with which it is concerned, these extending far beyond the law of 
tort. In 1998 the U.K. government announced that no proposal for regulation which 
has an impact upon businesses would be considered by ministers without a “regulatory 
impact assessment” being carried out. Rather than being just another bureaucratic 
requirement, the new procedures offer business and industry a major opportunity to 
influence the policy and legislative process.
70
 Parliamentary Bills are now 
accompanied by impact statements assessing the financial costs and benefits of the 
measures being proposed. In drawing up such statements civil servants are directed to 
consult widely. Twenty or so bodies are specifically named, one of them being the 
ABI.
71
 As a result, it is automatic for the ABI to be asked to estimate the effect of 
proposed reforms on insurance premiums. Insurability is therefore now a relevant 
consideration whenever statutory changes affecting tort are being considered. 
Although these impact statements have given insurers a formal opportunity to make 
representations to government, it is doubtful whether this has increased their influence 
very much. This is because their most effective representations continue to be 
exercised in private, behind closed doors.
72
  
One illustration of the effectiveness of such private lobbying is the overturning of a 
Law Commission recommendation that a particular financial formula be used to set 
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the discount rate in assessing damages for personal injury. In the Damages Act 1996 
the Commission‟s recommendation was replaced by a power given to the Lord 
Chancellor to change the rate as he saw fit. However, this discretionary power was not 
exercised for some time, and when a rate was eventually set it was less favourable to 
claimants than if the Commission‟s formula had been used. The Opposition 
spokesman in Parliament noted that the change in the Act was “mightily convenient to 
the insurance industry” and commented that it was the result of “whispering in 
appropriate ears.”73 
Conclusion 
Most of the facts we have cited about insurers and personal injury litigation 
have been proven time and again. They derive from a series of empirical studies, each 
broadly confirming the general picture.
74
 However, tort textbooks pay them little, if 
any, attention.
75
 In spite of law students being left in ignorance, it cannot be denied 
that insurers are fundamental to the operation of the tort system. “Insurance 
„technology‟ underlies the whole practice of tort law.”76 It is not merely an ancillary 
device to protect the insured, but is the “primary medium for the payment of 
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compensation, and tort law [is] a subsidiary part of the process.”77 Without insurance 
the tort system “would long ago have collapsed under the weight of the demands put 
on it and been replaced by an alternative, and perhaps more efficient system of 
accident compensation.”78 Of what that system might compose is beyond the scope of 
this article,
79
 but we are left with an appreciation of the importance of insurers to tort 
law, and a denial of the claim that insurance has had only a limited effect upon the 
system. 
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